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LESSONS	  FROM	  THE	  NINETEENTH	  CENTURY	  
CONTROVERSIES	  OVER	  BIBLE	  READING	  	  
AND	  AID	  TO	  RELIGIOUS	  SCHOOLS	  
	  William	  P.	  Marshall	  *	  
STEVEN	  K.	  GREEN,	  THE	  BIBLE,	  THE	  SCHOOL,	  AND	  THE	  CONSTITUTION:	  THE	  CLASH	  THAT	  SHAPED	  MODERN	  CHURCH-­‐STATE	  DOCTRINE	  (2012).	  Pp.	  304.	  Hardcover	  $29.95.	  	  In	  Everson	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education,1	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court,	  in	  its	  first	  modern	  Establishment	  Clause	   case,2	   stated	   that	  under	   the	  First	  Amendment	   “[n]o	  tax	  in	  any	  amount,	  large	  or	  small,	  [could]	  be	  levied	  to	  support	  any	  religious	  activi-­‐ties	  .	  .	  .”3	  and	  that	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  was	  intended	  to	  erect	  “‘a	  wall	  of	  separa-­‐tion	  between	  Church	  and	  State.’”4	  For	  close	  to	  forty	  years,	  Everson	  was	  the	  leading	  precedent	  in	  Establishment	  Clause	  jurisprudence	  and	  the	  decision’s	  no-­‐aid	  rhetoric	  dominated	  the	  Court’s	  discourse.	  And	  though	  its	  no-­‐aid	  principle	  was	  never	  rigidly	  enforced,5	   the	  Court	   relied	  heavily	  on	  Everson	   in	   invalidating	  numerous	  parochial	  aid	  programs.6	  Sixty-­‐five	  years	  later	   little	  remains	  of	  Everson’s	  no-­‐aid	  rhetoric	   in	  the	  Court’s	  current	  religion	  clause	  jurisprudence.	  The	  results	  in	  intervening	  cases	  amply	  reflect	  this	   development.	   In	  Agostini	   v.	   Felton,7	   for	   example,	   the	   Court	   directly	   overruled	  one	   of	   its	   precedents8	   and	  upheld	   a	   program	  allowing	  publically	   paid	   teachers	   to	  
                                                            	   *	   Kenan	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina.	  I	  am	  extraordinarily	  grateful	  to	  John	  Miller	  for	  his	  research	  assistance	  and	  to	  Dana	  Remus	  for	  her	  helpful	  comments.	  	  	   1.	  	   Everson	  v.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.	  of	  Ewing	  Twp.,	  330	  U.S.	  1	  (1947).	  	   2.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  7-­‐8.	  	   3.	  	   Id.	  at	  16.	  	   4.	  	   Id.	  at	  16	  (quoting	  Reynolds	  v.	  United	  States,	  98	  U.S.	  145,	  164	  (1878)).	  	   5.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  8-­‐18.	  The	  no	  aid	  principle	  was	  not	  even	  rigorously	  applied	  in	  Everson	  itself	  as	  the	  Court	  upheld	  the	  aid	  provision	  that	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  challenge	  in	  that	  case—a	  state	  program	  that	  provided	  bus	  transportation	  to	  students	  attending	  religious	  schools.	  See	  also,	  e.g.,	  Walz	  v.	  Tax	  Commission,	  397	  U.S.	  664	  (1970)	  (upholding	  property	  tax	  exemptions	  for	  religious	  property);	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.	  v.	  Allen,	  392	  U.S.	  236	  (1968)	  (upholding	  a	  program	  loaning	  textbooks	   to	  children	  attending	  reli-­‐gious	  schools).	  	  	   6.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Sch.	  Dist.	  of	  Grand	  Rapids	  v.	  Ball,	  473	  U.S.	  373	  (1985)	  (funding	  of	  public	  school	  teachers	  instructing	   religious	   school	   students	   on	   religious	   school	   premises);	  Meek	   v.	   Pittenger,	   421	   U.S.	   349	  (1975)	  (loans	  of	  instructional	  material	  to	  religious	  schools);	  Comm.	  for	  Public	  Education	  &	  Religious	  Lib-­‐erty	  v.	  Nyquist,	  413	  U.S.	  756	   (1973)	   (grants	   to	   religious	  schools	   for	  maintenance	  costs	  and	   tuition	   tax	  credit	  reimbursements);	  Lemon	  v.	  Kurtzman,	  411	  U.S.	  192	  (1973)	  (reimbursement	  to	  religious	  schools	  for	  secular	  educational	  services	  including	  teachers’	  salaries);	  Illinois	  ex.	  rel	  McCollum	  v.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.,	  333	  U.S.	  203	  (1948)	  (use	  of	  public	  schools	  facilities	  for	  religious	  release	  time	  programs).	  	   7.	  	   521	  U.S.	  203	  (1997).	  	   8.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  235	  (overruling	  Aguilar	  v.	  Felton,	  473	  U.S.	  402	  (1985)).	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provide	   remedial	   services	   to	   low	   income	   students	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   a	   parochial	  school.	   In	  Mitchell	   v.	  Helms9	   the	  Court	  went	   further,	  overturning	  both	  precedent10	  and	  a	  previously	  recognized	  Establishment	  Clause	  doctrinal	  tenet	  that	  government	  aid	  to	  pervasively	  sectarian	  religious	  institutions	  was	  impermissible.11	  In	  so	  doing,	  the	  Mitchell	  Court	  found	  constitutional	  a	  state	  statute	  that	  provided	  public	  funds	  to	  lend	  computers,	  software,	  and	  library	  books	  to	  parochial	  schools	  even	  though	  those	  materials	  could	  be	  used	  by	  the	  school	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  religious	  indoctrination.12	  And	   in	   Zelman	   v.	   Simmons-­‐Harris,13	   the	   Court	   upheld	   a	   voucher	   system	   allowing	  students	  to	  use	  public	  funds	  to	  attend	  parochial	  schools.14	  Part	  of	  the	  movement	  away	  from	  Everson	  in	  Establishment	  Clause	  doctrine	  is	  undoubtedly	   the	   result	   of	   a	   broader	   trend	   in	   First	   Amendment	   jurisprudence	   to	  treat	  religion	  and	  non-­‐religion	  relatively	  equally.15	  For	  example,	  under	  current	  Free	  Exercise	   Clause	   jurisprudence,	   an	   individual	   who	   claims	   that	   she	   has	   a	   religious	  reason	  for	  not	  complying	  with	  a	  neutral	  law	  of	  general	  applicability	  is	  no	  more	  enti-­‐tled	  to	  an	  exemption	  from	  that	  law	  than	  an	  individual	  raising	  a	  non-­‐religious	  objec-­‐tion.16	  Similarly,	  under	  the	  Free	  Speech	  Clause,	  the	  Court	  has	  consistently	  held	  that	  the	  government	  may	  not	  exclude	  religious	  speakers	  from	  access	  to	  government	  fo-­‐rums	  without	  violating	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  content-­‐neutrality.17	  Allowing	  re-­‐ligious	   institutions	   to	   receive	   the	   same	  kinds	  of	   government	   aid	   received	  by	  non-­‐religious	  entities	  might	   then	  be	  seen	  simply	  as	   the	  Establishment	  Clause	  corollary	  to	  these	  Free	  Exercise	  and	  Free	  Speech	  principles.	  The	  change	  may	  also	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  series	  of	  political	  and	  cultural	  changes	  that	   have	   occurred	   since	   the	   time	  Everson	   was	   decided.	   As	   Ira	   Lupu	   has	  written,	  “America	  has	   experienced	  a	   religious	  awakening,	   in	  which	  high-­‐intensity,	  publicly	  oriented	  religion	  has	  expanded	  dramatically.”18	  Against	  this	  background,	  a	  theory	  of	  separatized,	  private	  religion	  has	  become	  far	  less	  consonant	  with	  the	  actual	  reality.	  Supreme	  Court	  decisions	  addressing	  school	  prayer	  may	  have	  also	  played	  a	  role.19	  As	  John	  Jeffries	  and	  James	  Ryan	  have	  noted,	  the	  school	  prayer	  decisions	  may	  have	  trig-­‐gered	  a	  backlash	  against	  the	  no-­‐aid	  principle	  by	  its	  intellectual	  founders,	  Christian	  evangelicals,20	  who	  had	   long	  believed	  that	  state	  support	  of	  religion	  would	  weaken	  religion	   by	   fostering	   its	   dependence	   upon	   the	   state	   and	   subjecting	   it	   to	   “worldly	  
                                                            	   9.	  	   530	  U.S.	  793	  (2000).	  	   10.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  835-­‐36	  (overruling	  Meek,	  421	  U.S.	  349).	  	   11.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  826-­‐29	  (plurality	  opinion).	  	   12.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  809-­‐14,	  829-­‐35.	  	   13.	  	   536	  U.S.	  639	  (2002).	  	   14.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  648-­‐63.	  	   15.	  	   See	  William	  P.	  Marshall,	  What	  is	  the	  Matter	  with	  Equality?:	  An	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Equal	  Treatment	  
of	  Religion	  and	  Nonreligion	  in	  First	  Amendment	  Jurisprudence,	  75	  IND.	  L.J.	  193,	  193	  (2000).	  	   16.	  	   See	  Emp’t	  Div.,	  Dep’t	  of	  Human	  Resources	  of	  Or.	  v.	  Smith,	  494	  U.S.	  872	  (1990).	  	   17.	  	   See	  Rosenberger	  v.	  Rector	  &	  Visitors	  of	  Univ.	  of	  Va.,	  515	  U.S.	  819	  (1995);	  Widmar	  v.	  Vincent,	  454	  U.S.	  263	  (1981).	  	   18.	  	   Ira	  C.	  Lupu,	  The	  Lingering	  Death	  of	  Separationism,	  62	  GEO.	  WASH.	  L.	  REV.	  230,	  232	  (1994).	  	   19.	  	   Sch.	  Dist.	  Of	  Abington	  Twp.	   v.	   Schempp,	  374	  U.S.	   203	   (1963);	  Engel	   v	  Vitale,	   370	  U.S.	   421,	   429	  (1962).	  	  	   20.	  	   John	  C.	  Jeffries	  Jr.	  &	  James	  E.	  Ryan,	  A	  Political	  History	  of	  the	  Establishment	  Clause,	  100	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  279,	  328-­‐29	  (2001).	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corruptions.”21	  Removing	  prayer	   from	   the	  public	   schools	  was	  seen	  by	  some	  evan-­‐gelicals	  as	  overtly	  antagonistic	  to	  religion,	  thereby	  provoking	  a	  political	  response.	  More	  recently,	  the	  attack	  on	  Everson	  and	  its	  no-­‐aid	  principle	  has	  come	  from	  a	  very	  different	  angle.	  Some,	  most	  notably,	  Justice	  Clarence	  Thomas,	  have	  argued	  that	  rather	   than	   reflecting	  a	  principled	  view	  of	   church-­‐state	   relations,	   the	  no-­‐aid	  posi-­‐tion	   is	   grounded	   in	   nineteenth	   century	   anti-­‐Catholic	   bias	   and	   bigotry.22	   Justice	  Thomas	   contended,	   therefore,	   that	   the	   position	   against	   aid	   to	   religious	   education	  should	  be	  rejected	  because	  of	   this	  pedigree,	  even	  aside	   from	  any	   intellectual	  defi-­‐ciencies	  that	  it	  might	  hold.23	  Steven	   K.	   Green’s	   remarkable	   book,	   The	   Bible,	   the	   School,	   and	   the	   Constitu-­‐
tion24	   is,	   in	   large	   part,	   a	   response	   to,	   and	   refutation	   of,	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   no-­‐aid	  principle	   is	   founded	   in	   anti-­‐Catholic	   bigotry.	   By	   closely	   examining	   the	   nineteenth	  century	  historical	  record,	  Green	  succeeds	  in	  his	  mission.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Green	  does	  not	  assert,	  nor	  could	  he,	  that	  anti-­‐Catholic	  bias	  had	  no	  role	  in	  the	  debates	  over	  church-­‐state	  relations	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Rather,	  he	  effectively	  shows	  that	  far	  more	  factors	  were	  at	  work	  in	  this	  history	  than	  anti-­‐Catholicism	  alone,	  and	  that	  the	  arguments	   favoring	   the	  no-­‐aid	  position	  were	  deeply	   rooted	   in	   a	  number	  of	  philo-­‐sophical	  and	  theological	  movements,	  some	  pre-­‐dating	  and	  others	  contemporaneous	  with	  that	  time	  period.	  
The	  Bible,	  the	  School,	  and	  the	  Constitution	  is	  critically	  important	  in	  another	  re-­‐spect.	  In	  presenting	  this	  history,	  Green	  relates	  how	  the	  question	  of	  aid	  to	  private	  re-­‐ligious	  schools	  was	   inter-­‐related	  with	   the	  question	  of	   the	  appropriate	   role	  of	   reli-­‐gious	  exercises,	  particularly	  Bible	  reading,	  in	  the	  public	  schools.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  aid	  to	  private	  religious	  schools	  and	  public	  school	  prayer	  is-­‐sues—contemporaneously	   termed	   the	   “School	   Question”25—dominated	   the	   nine-­‐teenth	  century	  debate	  over	  church-­‐state	  relations.	  Accordingly,	  along	  with	  his	  anal-­‐ysis	  of	   the	   funding	   issue,	  Green	  offers	  an	   in-­‐depth	  study	  of	  how	  the	  school	  prayer	  issue	  was	  treated	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Over	  one	  hundred	  years	  later,	  societal	  divisions	  over	  public	  school	  prayer	  and	  private	   religious	   school	   funding	   have	   not	   gone	   away.	   Even	   though	   the	   Court	   has	  consistently	  held	   the	  practice	  of	  public	   school	  prayer	   to	  be	  unconstitutional	   since	  the	  1960’s,26	   a	  majority	  of	  Americans	   still	   favor	   school	  prayer27	  and	   the	  Court	   re-­‐
                                                            	   21.	  	   See	  MARK	  DEWOLFE	  HOWE,	  THE	  GARDEN	  AND	  THE	  WILDERNESS:	  RELIGION	  AND	  GOVERNMENT	  IN	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  HISTORY	  6	  (1965).	  	  	   22.	  	   See	  Mitchell	  v.	  Helms,	  530	  U.S.	  793,	  828	  (2000);	  see	  also	  PHILIP	  HAMBURGER,	  SEPARATION	  OF	  CHURCH	  AND	  STATE	  (2004).	  	   23.	  	   See	  Mitchell,	  530	  U.S.	  at	  828.	  	   24.	  	   STEVEN	   K.	   GREEN,	   THE	   BIBLE,	   THE	   SCHOOL,	   AND	   THE	   CONSTITUTION:	   THE	   CLASH	   THAT	   SHAPED	  MODERN	  CHURCH-­‐STATE	  DOCTRINE	  (2012).	  	   25.	  	   Id.	  at	  8.	  	   26.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Santa	  Fe	  Indep.	  Sch.	  Dist.	  v.	  Doe,	  530	  U.S.	  290,	  302	  (2000);	  Lee	  v.	  Weisman,	  505	  U.S.	  577	  (1992);	  Engel	  v.	  Vitale,	  370	  US	  421,	  429	   (1962);	  Sch.	  Dist.	  of	  Abington	  Twp.	  v.	   Schempp,	  374	  U.S.	  203	  (1963).	  	   27.	  	   See	   Jennifer	   Riley,	   Survey:	   65	   Percent	   of	   Americans	   Support	   Prayer	   in	   Public	   Schools,	   CHRISTIAN	  POST,	   Feb.	   14,	   2011,	   http://www.christianpost.com/news/survey-­‐65-­‐percent-­‐of-­‐americans-­‐support-­‐prayer-­‐in-­‐public-­‐schools-­‐48969	   (citing	   a	   Rasmussen	   Report	   in	   which	   65	   percent	   of	   respondents	   sup-­‐ported	   prayer	   in	   public	   schools);	   see	   Religion	   in	   the	   Public	   Schools,	   PEW	   RES.	   CTR.,	   May	   9,	   2007,	  www.pewresearch.org/2007/05/09/religion-­‐in-­‐the-­‐public-­‐schools/	   (stating	   that	   69	   percent	   of	   Ameri-­‐cans	  believe	  that	  “liberals	  have	  gone	  too	  far	  in	  trying	  to	  keep	  religion	  out	  of	  the	  schools	  .	  .	  .	  ”);	  see	  David	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mains	  divided	  over	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  prohibition.28	  School	  funding	  is	  equally	  conten-­‐tious.	  The	   last	  two	  funding	  cases	  saw	  a	  deeply	  divided	  Court29	  and	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  Court	  will	  approve	  additional	  parochial	  aid	  programs	  remains	  uncertain.	  Green’s	   in-­‐depth	   account	   of	   the	   persons,	   the	   politics,	   and	   the	   events	   that	  shaped	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  debate	  over	  the	  School	  Question	  is	  therefore	  particu-­‐larly	  useful	   in	  providing	   insight	   into	   issues	   that	  are	  as	   relevant	  now	  as	   they	  were	  then.	  Part	  I	  of	  this	  article	  examines	  Green’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Catholic	  animus	  is-­‐sue.	  Part	  II	  looks	  at	  the	  broader	  history	  discussed	  by	  Green	  for	  some	  of	  its	  implica-­‐tions	   regarding	   the	   contemporary	   debate	   over	   state	   funding	   of	   private	   religious	  schools	  and	  religious	  exercises	  in	  public	  schools.	  Part	  III	  offers	  a	  brief	  conclusion.	  PART	  I:	  ANTI-­‐CATHOLIC	  ANIMUS	  AND	  THE	  NO-­‐AID	  PRINCIPLE	  In	  his	  2000	  opinion	  in	  Mitchell	  v.	  Helms,30	  Justice	  Thomas	  wrote:	  	   [H]ostility	   to	   aid	   to	   pervasively	   sectarian	   schools	   has	   a	   shameful	  pedigree	  that	  we	  do	  not	  hesitate	  to	  disavow.	  .	  .	  .	  Opposition	  to	  aid	  to	  “sectarian”	   schools	   acquired	   prominence	   in	   the	   1870’s	   with	   Con-­‐gress’	  consideration	  (and	  near	  passage)	  of	  the	  Blaine	  Amendment,	  which	  would	  have	  amended	  the	  Constitution	  to	  bar	  any	  aid	  to	  sec-­‐tarian	  institutions.	  Consideration	  of	  the	  amendment	  arose	  at	  a	  time	  of	   pervasive	   hostility	   to	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   and	   to	   Catholics	   in	  general,	   and	   it	   was	   an	   open	   secret	   that	   “sectarian”	   was	   code	   for	  “Catholic.”31	  	  Based	  on	  this	  historical	  record,	  Thomas	  argued,	  the	  no-­‐aid	  principle	  should	  be	  un-­‐derstood	  as	  “born	  of	  bigotry,	  [and]	  should	  be	  buried	  now.”32	  The	   implications	  of	  Thomas’s	   thesis	   for	   the	  direction	  of	  religion	  clause	   juris-­‐prudence	  are	  dramatic.	  As	  Green	  notes	  in	  his	  introductory	  chapter:	  	   Whether	   or	   not	   one	   agrees	  with	   this	   assessment,	   this	   is	   a	   signifi-­‐cant	  re-­‐accounting	  of	  the	  development	  of	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state	  in	  America.	  Essentially,	  this	  view	  declares	  that	  the	  ideological	  basis	  for	  fifty	  years	  of	  modern	  church-­‐state	  doctrine	  was	  based	  not	  on	  noble	  principles	  espoused	  by	  Jefferson	  and	  Madison,	  but	  on	  bias	  and	   suspicion	   arising	   a	   half-­‐century	   later	   by	   those	  who	   sought	   to	  
                                                                                                                                                    W.	   Moore,	   Public	   Favors	   Voluntary	   Prayer	   for	   Public	   Schools,	   GALLUP.COM,	   Aug.	   26,	   2005,	  http://www.gallup.com/poll/18136/public-­‐favors-­‐voluntary-­‐prayer-­‐public-­‐schools.aspx	   (stating	   that	  76	  percent	  of	  Americans	  favor	  some	  form	  of	  school	  prayer).	  	   28.	  	   In	  Lee,	   the	  Court	   in	   a	  5-­‐4	  decision	   struck	  down	  prayer	   at	   a	  public	   school	   graduation	   ceremony	  over	   a	   vehement	   dissent	  written	   by	   Justice	   Scalia.	  Lee,	   505	  U.S.	   577.	   In	  Santa	   Fe,	   it	   invalidated	  public	  school	  prayer	  at	  an	  athletic	  event	  over	  an	  equally	  impassioned	  dissent	  written	  by	  Justice	  Rehnquist	  on	  behalf	  of	  himself	  and	  Justices	  Scalia	  and	  Thomas.	  Santa	  Fe,	  530	  U.S.	  290.	  	   29.	  	   Zelman	  v.	   Simmons-­‐Harris,	  536	  U.S.	  639,	  641	   (2002)	   (upholding	   school	  vouchers	   in	  a	  5-­‐4	  deci-­‐sion);	  Mitchell	  v.	  Helms,	  530	  U.S.	  793,	  799-­‐800	  (2000)	  (4-­‐2-­‐2	  decision	  upholding	  a	  state	  statute	  that	  pro-­‐vided	  public	  funds	  to	  lend	  computers,	  software,	  and	  library	  books	  to	  parochial	  schools).	  	   30.	  	   Mitchell,	  530	  U.S.	  793.	  	   31.	  	   Id.	  at	  828.	  	   32.	  	   Id.	  at	  829.	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maintain	  a	  Protestant	  stranglehold	  on	  the	  culture	  by	  subjugating	  all	  religious	   competition—particularly	   the	   Catholic	   Church.	   And	   it	  characterizes	   the	  nineteenth	   century	  debate	   over	   religious	   school	  funding—and	   the	   related	   controversy	   over	   religious	   activities	   in	  the	  public	   schools—as	  being	  motivated	  primarily	   by	   anti-­‐Catholic	  animus.	  It	  challenges	  standard	  interpretations	  of	  nineteenth	  centu-­‐ry	  legal	  and	  educational	  history	  and	  calls	  for	  a	  reevaluation	  of	  those	  historical	  developments.33	  	  In	  fact,	  however,	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  “no-­‐aid	  principle”	  was	  “born	  in	  bigotry”	  is	  not	   defensible.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   the	   notion	   of	   church-­‐state	   separation	  was	   deeply	  ensconced	  in	  American	  thought	  even	  before	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  history	  referred	  to	  by	  Justice	  Thomas	  in	  his	  Mitchell	  opinion	  and	  scrutinized	  in-­‐depth	  by	  Green.	  Ear-­‐ly	  religious	  leaders	  in	  the	  Colonies	  writing	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  and	  eighteenth	  centu-­‐ries,	  such	  as	  Roger	  Williams	  and	  Isaac	  Bacchus,	  called	  for	  a	  rigid	  church	  state	  sepa-­‐ration	   because	   they	   believed	   that	   government	   support	   of	   religion	   corrupted	   its	  purity	  and	  its	  other-­‐worldly	  purposes.34	  Aid	  to	  religion	  was	  improper	  according	  to	  this	  “anti-­‐corruption”	  principle35	  because	  it	  served	  to	  weaken	  the	  purported	  “bene-­‐ficiaries”	  of	  the	  government	  largesse.	  Anti-­‐Catholicism	  was	  not	  a	  factor.	  James	  Madison,	  writing	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  came	  at	  the	  matter	  from	  a	  totally	  different	  angle.	   In	  his	  Memorial	  and	  Remonstrance	  Against	  Religious	  Assess-­‐
ments,36	  Madison	  contended	  that	  government	  aid	  to	  religion	  should	  be	  opposed	  be-­‐cause	  it	  would	  violate	  the	  consciences	  of	  the	  taxpayers	  forced	  to	  support	  religious	  institutions	  with	  whose	  beliefs	  they	  disagreed.37	  Thus,	  while	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  ar-­‐gument	  was	  focused	  on	  protecting	  the	  purported	  religious	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  gov-­‐ernment	  aid,	  Madison’s	  argument	  was	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  non-­‐beneficiary	  religious	  believers	  and	  institutions.38	  Again,	  anti-­‐Catholicism	  played	  no	  role.	  Green’s	  account	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  history	  presents	  additional	  factors	  that	  played	  a	   role	   in	   the	  development	  of	   the	  no-­‐aid	  principles,	   all	  of	  which,	  again,	  had	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   anti-­‐Catholic	   animus.	   The	   first	   of	   these,	   and	   perhaps	   the	  most	   important,	  was	   the	   rise	   of	   public	   non-­‐sectarian	   education,	   a	  movement	   that	  
                                                            	   33.	  	   GREEN,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  6-­‐7.	  	   34.	  	   See	  HOWE,	  supra	  note	  21,	  at	  6	  (discussing	  Roger	  Williams’	  vision	  of	  separation);	  ELWYN	  A.	  SMITH,	  RELIGIOUS	   LIBERTY	   IN	   THE	   UNITED	   STATES:	   THE	   DEVELOPMENT	   OF	   CHURCH-­‐STATE	   THOUGHT	   SINCE	   THE	  REVOLUTIONARY	  ERA	  15–26	  (1972)	  (detailing	  the	  involvement	  of	  Isaac	  Backus,	  a	  New	  England	  pastor,	   in	  advocating	  the	  evangelical	  theory	  of	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state);	  Timothy	  L.	  Hall,	  Roger	  Williams	  and	  
the	  Foundations	  of	  Religious	  Liberty,	  71	  B.U.	  L	  REV.	  455,	  469	  (1991)	  (also	  discussing	  Roger	  Williams’	  vi-­‐sion	  of	  separation).	  See	  also	  Mitchell,	  530	  U.S.	  at	  868	  (Souter,	  J.,	  dissenting)	  (“[t]he	  establishment	  prohibi-­‐tion	  of	  government	  religious	  funding	  .	  .	  .	  is	  meant	  .	  .	  .	  to	  protect	  the	  integrity	  of	  religion	  against	  the	  corro-­‐sion	  of	  secular	  support.”).	  	   35.	  	   See	  Andrew	  Koppelman,	  Corruption	  of	  Religion	  and	   the	  Establishment	  Clause,	   50	  WM.	  &	  MARY	  L.	  REV.	  1831	  (2009).	  	   36.	  	   James	  Madison,	  Memorial	  and	  Remonstrance	  against	  Religious	  Assessment	   (1785)	   (on	   file	  with	  the	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Library).	  	   37.	  	   See	  Ariz.	  Christian	  Sch.	  Tuition	  Org.	  v.	  Winn,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  1436,	  1446-­‐47	  (2011)	  (quoting	  Noah	  Feld-­‐man,	  Intellectual	  Origins	  of	  the	  Establishment	  Clause,	  77	  N.Y.U.	  L.	  REV.	  346,	  351	  (2002)).	  	   38.	  	   See	  also	  Everson	  v.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.	  of	  Ewing	  Twp.,	  330	  U.S.	  1,	  13	  (1947)	  (citing	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  Virginia	  Bill	  for	  Religious	  Liberty	  (authored	  by	  Thomas	  Jefferson)	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  “to	  compel	  a	  man	  to	  furnish	  contributions	  of	  money	  for	  the	  propagation	  of	  opinions	  which	  he	  disbelieves,	  is	  sinful	  and	  tyrannical.”).	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began	   long	  before	   the	  mid-­‐1830s,	   the	  period	  when	  anti-­‐Catholicism	  began	  to	   take	  hold	  as	  a	  response	  to	  a	  perceived	  cultural	  threat	  to	  the	  majoritarian,	  Protestant	  de-­‐mographic.39	   In	   1805,40	   education	   reformers	   in	   New	   York	   began	   the	   movement	  away	   from	   a	   heavy	   emphasis	   on	   teaching	   religion	   in	   early	   education	   by	   opening	  public	  nonsectarian	  schools	  rooted	  in	  the	  “common	  rudiments	  of	  learning”	  and	  in-­‐corporating	  only	  “the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  Christian	  religion,	  free	  from	  all	  sectarian	   bias.”41	   In	   1827,42	   Massachusetts,	   under	   the	   direction	   of	   Horace	   Mann,	  took	  this	  one	  stop	  further	  in	  striving	  to	  remove	  any	  residual	  doctrinal	  elements	  or	  evangelizing	  tendencies	  from	  public	  education,43	  and	  create	  a	  program	  that	  would	  be	  palatable	  to	  all	  Christians,	  including	  Catholics.44	  Reformers	  in	  other	  states	  advo-­‐cated	  similar	  changes.45	  Opposition	   to	   funding	   private	   religious	   schools	   was	   inextricably	   tied	   to	   the	  support	  of	   the	  early	  public	   schools	   for	   a	  number	  of	   reasons.46	  First,	   public	   school	  advocates	  believed	  that	  protecting	  the	  financial	  stability	  of	  the	  newly	  formed	  com-­‐mon	  schools	  meant	  that	  school	  funding	  could	  not	  be	  diverted	  to	  private	  institutions.	  47	  Second,	  they	  favored	  funding	  only	  public	  schools	  for	  the	  pedagogical	  reason	  that	  a	  universal	  curriculum	  was	  necessary	  to	  educate	  and	  prepare	  children	  most	  effec-­‐tively	   for	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   society	   into	  which	   they	  would	  matriculate.48	   Third,	  they	  contended	  that	  public	  funds	  should	  go	  only	  to	  public	  schools	  so	  that	  the	  state	  would	  be	  able	  to	  assure	  accountability	  and	  quality	  control	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  govern-­‐ment	  funds.49	  None	  of	  these	  reasons	  (all	  of	  which	  incidentally	  are	  fully	  present	  in	  contempo-­‐rary	   debates	   over	   school	   vouchers)50	   were	   related	   to	   anti-­‐Catholicism.	   Horace	  Mann’s	  criticisms	  of	  funding	  for	  parochial	  schools,	  for	  example,	  were	  directed	  not	  at	  Catholics	  but	  at	  evangelical	  Protestants	  who	  resisted	   the	  expanding	  policy	  of	  ecu-­‐menism.51	  Moreover,	   as	  Green	  notes,	   the	   “developing	  no-­‐funding	   rule	   applied	  not	  only	   to	  Catholic	   schools	   but	   also	   to	   the	  plethora	  of	   Protestant	   schools	   (Episcopal,	  Methodist,	  Presbyterian,	  Lutheran,	  Dutch	  Reformed)”	  and	  was	  actually	  responsible	  for	   a	   decline	   in	   Protestant	   private	   schooling.52	   Leaders	   of	   Catholic	   communities,	  meanwhile,	   initially	   supported	   the	   nonsectarian	   agenda,	   and	   encouraged	   attend-­‐ance	  at	  these	  schools	  by	  Catholic	  youths.53	  To	  be	  sure,	  as	  Catholic	  and	  Protestant	  divisions	  became	  more	  pronounced	  lat-­‐
                                                            	   39.	  	   GREEN,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  19.	  	   40.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  16.	  	   41.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  17.	  	   42.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  20.	  	   43.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  21.	  	   44.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  23.	  	   45.	  	   See	  id.	  	   46.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  11.	  	   47.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  45.	  	   48.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  45-­‐46.	  	   49.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  46.	  	   50.	  	   See	  generally	  Helen	  F.	  Ladd,	  School	  Vouchers:	  A	  Critical	  View,	  16	  J.	  ECON.	  PERSP.	  3	  (2002)	  (examin-­‐ing	  the	  policy	  arguments	  surrounding	  the	  debate	  over	  vouchers	  and	  school	  choice).	  	   51.	  	   GREEN,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  28.	  	   52.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  13.	  	   53.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  33.	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er	  in	  the	  century	  in	  reaction	  to	  massive	  increases	  in	  Irish,	  German,	  and	  Italian	  im-­‐migration,54	  anti-­‐Catholicism	  may	  have	  become	  a	  more	  prominent	  factor	  in	  the	  re-­‐sistance	  to	  parochial	  school	   funding.55	   It	  does	  not	   follow,	  however,	   that	  objections	  to	   parochial	   school	   funding	   can	   be	   explained	   exclusively	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   anti-­‐Catholic	   animus.	   Most	   importantly,	   not	   all	   those	   opposing	   state	   aid	   to	   religious	  schools	  were	  anti-­‐Catholic.	  As	  noted	  previously,	   some	  opposed	  aid	   to	  private	  reli-­‐gious	   education	   on	   a	   number	   of	   independent	   grounds	   that	   arose	   earlier	   than,	  and/or	   independent	  of,	   the	  advent	  of	  anti-­‐Catholic	  sentiment.56	  Further,	   for	  what-­‐ever	  it	  is	  worth,	  it	   is	  not	  clear	  that	  religious	  prejudice	  was	  the	  motivating	  force	  on	  the	  question	  of	  aid	  to	  private	  religious	  schools	  even	  among	  those	  who	  lapsed	   into	  anti-­‐Catholic	  bigotry.	  As	  one	  writer	  has	  succinctly	  stated,	  while	  “[n]ativist	  prejudice	  did	   sometimes	   strengthen	   popular	   convictions	   about	   separation	  .	  .	  .	   [f]ar	  more	   of-­‐ten	  .	  .	  .	  a	  preexisting	  commitment	  to	  separation	  provided	  the	  rationale	  or	  excuse	  for	  anti-­‐Catholicism.”57	  Green’s	  account	  of	  the	  School	  Question—i.e.,	  the	  relationship	  between	  public	  school	  prayer	  and	  private	  school	  funding—provides	  another	  important	  ground	  for	  rejecting	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   no-­‐aid	   principle	   should	   be	   deemed	   as	   being	   solely	  founded	  in	  anti-­‐Catholic	  bigotry.	  The	  no-­‐aid	  position	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  exist-­‐ing	   in	   a	   vacuum.	   As	   Green	   points	   out,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   proposal	   of	   the	   Blaine	  Amendment,	   the	  provision	   that	   Justice	  Thomas	  claims	   reflects	  anti-­‐Catholic	  bigot-­‐ry,58	  the	  country	  was	  involved	  in	  a	  broad	  discussion	  about	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  so-­‐ciety	  that	  transcended	  parochial	  aid	  issues.	  The	  School	  Question	  was	  “part	  of	  a	  larg-­‐er	  debate	  over	  the	  religious	  character	  of	  the	  nation	  and	  its	  institutions.”59	  Attempts	  were	  made	  from	  one	  faction,	  for	  example,	  to	  pass	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  that	  would	  declare	  the	  United	  States	  a	  Christian	  Nation,60	  while	  efforts	  from	  a	  segment	  at	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  sought	  a	  “total	  separation	  of	  Church	  and	  State”	  that	   would	   repeal	   church	   property	   tax	   exemptions,	   disallow	   Bible	   reading	   in	   the	  public	  school,	  and	  overturn	  Sunday	  observance	  laws,	  among	  other	  goals.61	  This	  national	  debate	  on	  religion	  involved	  spiritual	  leaders,	  public	  intellectuals,	  the	  press,	  and	  politicians,	  including	  a	  remarkably	  thoughtful	  contribution	  by	  Presi-­‐dent	  Ulysses	  S.	  Grant.62	  Some	  of	  the	  entries	   in	  this	  national	  discussion	  were	  based	  on	   theological	   principle,	   some	   on	   constitutional	   theory,	   some	   on	   civic	   conviction,	  some	  on	  chauvinism,	   some	  on	  xenophobia,	   and	   some	  on	  no	  more	   than	  cynical	   ef-­‐forts	  to	  manipulate	  public	  opinion	  for	  partisan	  purpose.63	  Some	  were	  influenced	  by	  anti-­‐Catholic	  animus,	   some	  were	  not.	   James	  Blaine	  himself,	   for	  example,	  appeared	  to	   be	  motivated	   primarily	   by	   politics	   rather	   than	   by	   anti-­‐Catholic	   animus,	   or,	   for	  
                                                            	   54.	  	   See	  id.	  	   55.	  	   See	  id.	  	   56.	  	   See	  supra	  notes	  34-­‐49	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  	   57.	  	   William	  R.	  Hutchison,	   Book	  Review,	   23	   L.	  &	  HIST.	   REV.	   201,	   203	   (2005)	   (reviewing	  HAMBURGER,	  
supra	  note	  22).	  	   58.	  	   See	  Mitchell	  v.	  Helms,	  530	  U.S.	  793,	  913	  (2000).	  	   59.	  	   GREEN,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  206.	  	   60.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  138-­‐40.	  	   61.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  167.	  	   62.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  187.	  	   63.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  188,	  194-­‐95.	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that	   matter,	   high	   principle.64	   (Blaine’s	   mother	   was	   a	   Catholic	   and	   his	   daughters	  were	  educated	  in	  Catholic	  boarding	  schools).65	  Given	  the	  depth,	  breadth,	  and	  com-­‐plexity	  of	  this	  historical	  record,	  Green’s	  case	  that	  the	  no-­‐aid	  principle	  cannot	  be	  as-­‐cribed	  to	  simple	  anti-­‐Catholic	  animus	  alone	  seems	  irrefutable.66	  PART	  II:	  LESSONS	  FROM	  GREEN’S	  NINETEENTH	  CENTURY	  ACCOUNT	  There	  is	  much	  to	  learn	  from	  The	  Bible,	  the	  School	  and	  the	  Constitution	  beyond	  only	  its	  refutation	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  no-­‐aid	  principle	  was	  “born	  in	  bigotry.”	  The	  book	  provides	  enormous	  insight	  into	  the	  strains	  of	  social,	  educational,	  constitution-­‐al,	  theological,	  and	  civic	  theory	  that	  pervaded	  the	  era.	  It	  is	  rich	  in	  its	  account	  of	  the	  personalities	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  America.	  It	  reminds	  us—as	  if	  we	  need	   to	   be	   reminded—of	   the	   destructive	   power	   of	   nativist,	   anti-­‐immigrant	   senti-­‐ment.	  Green’s	  review	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  debates	  over	  the	  School	  Question	  al-­‐so	  brings	  to	  life	  the	  dangers	  of	  religious	  divisiveness	  when	  religion	  and	  politics	  mix.	  It	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  ploy	  of	  turning	  one	  religion	  against	  another	  can	  readily	  be	  used	   by	   politicians	   intent	   on	   exploiting	   an	   us-­‐versus-­‐them	  mentality	   for	   partisan	  ends.67	  In	  some	  instances,	  this	  means	  that	  religious	  or	  political	  leaders	  will	  seek	  to	  kindle	  bias	  against	  a	  minority	  religious	  group	  for	  their	  own	  advantage,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  nineteenth	  century’s	  anti-­‐Catholicism	  legacy.68	  In	  other	  instances,	  this	  means	  religious	  partisans	  may	  seek	  to	  use	  government	   to	  affirm	  their	  own	  religion’s	  cul-­‐tural	   or	   theological	   dominance,69	   as	   when	   some	   Protestants	   during	   this	   period	  sought	  to	  have	  only	  the	  Protestant	  Bible	  read	  in	  the	  public	  schools.70	  In	  either	  case,	  a	  dangerous	  and	  harmful	  politics	  inevitably	  follows.71	  Two	  other	  questions	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  history	  recounted	  in	  Green’s	  book	  de-­‐serve	  special	  mention.	  First,	  what	  are	   its	   implications	  for	  current	  disputes	  regard-­‐
                                                            	   64.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  195-­‐97.	  	   65.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  196.	  	   66.	  	   See	  also	  Kent	  Greenawalt,	  History	  as	  Ideology:	  Philip	  Hamburger’s	  Separation	  of	  Church	  and	  State,	  93	  CALIF.	  L.	  REV.	  367,	  392	  (2005)	  (book	  review)	  (cautioning	  against	  an	  oversimplified	  embrace	  of	  anti-­‐Catholicism	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  explanation	  for	  the	  doctrine	  of	  church-­‐state	  separation).	  	   67.	  	   See	  GREEN,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  209-­‐10,	  217-­‐18.	  	   68.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  217-­‐18.	  	   69.	  	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   Protestant	   chauvinism	  was	   the	   only	   factor	   at	  work.	   There	  was,	   after	   all,	  prayer	  in	  the	  public	  school	  long	  before	  the	  swelling	  of	  anti-­‐Catholic	  sentiment	  and	  many	  believed	  that	  it	  was	  pedagogically	  necessary	  to	  have	  some	  religion	  in	  early	  education	  in	  order	  to	  inculcate	  moral	  values.	  
See	  id.	  at	  11-­‐12.	  	   70.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  100.	  	   71.	  	   Notably,	  one	  hundred	  years	   later,	   the	  Court	   in	  Engel	  v.	  Vitale,	  370	  U.S.	  421	  (1962),	  elevated	  the	  religious	   divisiveness	   concern	   to	   a	   constitutional	   dimension	  when	   it	   warned	   in	   the	   context	   of	   school	  prayer	  of	  “the	  anguish,	  hardship,	  and	  bitter	  strife”	  that	  inevitably	  follows	  when	  “zealous	  religious	  groups	  [struggle]	  with	  one	  another	   to	  obtain	   the	  Government's	  stamp	  of	  approval.”	   Id.	  at	  429.	  The	  nineteenth	  century	   experience	   suggests	   that	  Engel’s	   suggestion	   that	   removing	  matters	   from	  political	   contest	   that	  may	   trigger	   religion’s	   seeking	   the	   government	   stamp	   of	   approval,	   such	   as	   the	   government’s	   choice	   of	  school	  prayer,	  was	  well-­‐taken.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  question	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  legislative	  prayer	   will	   be	   before	   the	   Court	   during	   the	   upcoming	   October	   2013	   Term.	   See	   Galloway	   v.	   Town	   of	  Greece,	  681	  F.3d	  20	  (2d	  Cir.	  2012),	  cert.	  granted,	  81	  U.S.L.W.	  3336	  (May	  20,	  2013)	  (No.12-­‐696).	  As	  Chris-­‐topher	  Lund	  has	  shown	  with	  respect	  to	  current	  controversies	  surrounding	  legislative	  prayer,	  the	  serious	  divisions	  that	  arise	  between	  competing	  religious	  forces	  when	  the	  choice	  of	  prayer	  is	  left	  to	  the	  political	  processes	  does	  not	  occur	  only	  when	  the	  venue	  is	  the	  public	  schools.	  See	  Christopher	  C.	  Lund,	  Legislative	  
Prayer	  and	  the	  Secret	  Costs	  of	  Religious	  Endorsements,	  94	  MINN.	  L.	  REV.	  972	  (2010).	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ing	   the	  constitutionality	  of	   religious	  exercises	   in	   the	  public	   schools?	  Second,	  what	  are	   its	   implications	   for	   the	   question	   of	   aid	   to	   private	   religious	   education?	   How	  should	   the	  nineteenth	  century	  debates	  over	  both	   facets	  of	   the	  School	  Question,	   in	  short,	  affect	  our	  understanding	  of	   those	  same	  issues	  today?	  The	  remainder	  of	   this	  section	  offers	  an	  opening	  response	  to	  these	  inquiries.	  
Bible	  Reading	  and	  the	  Changeable	  Meanings	  of	  ‘Non-­‐Sectarianism’	  and	  ‘Hostility	  to	  
Religion’	  	   As	  Green	  relates,	  the	  meaning	  of	  non-­‐sectarianism	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  nine-­‐teenth	   century	   was	   relatively	   clear.	   Because	   the	   country	   was	   predominately	  Protestant,	   non-­‐sectarianism	   meant	   non-­‐favoritism	   among	   the	   competing	  Protestant	  sects.72	  Horace	  Mann	  then	  could	  be	  fully	  consistent	  in	  reconciling	  public	  school	   (Protestant)	   Bible	   readings	   with	   his	   commitment	   to	   non-­‐sectarian	   educa-­‐tion.73	  As	   the	   country	   grew	   more	   religiously	   diverse,	   however,	   the	   assertion	   that	  neutrality	  among	  Protestant	  sects	  was	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  a	  true,	  religiously-­‐neutral	  non-­‐sectarianism	   became	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   defend.	   Thus	   Green	   quotes	   an	  1869	   Harpers	   Weekly	   editorial	   supporting	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   Cincinnati	   school	  board	  seeking	  to	  remove	  Bible	  reading	  from	  the	  public	  schools	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  was	   time	   “for	  Protestants	   to	   recognize	   that	  not	   all	   Christians	   agreed	  on	   the	   same	  ‘great	   general	   truths	   of	   the	   Bible.’”74	   And	   indeed	   they	   did	   not.	   Catholics	   and	  Protestants	  did	  not	  (and	  do	  not)	  even	  share	  the	  same	  Bible.75	  Accordingly,	   a	   commitment	   to	   a	   non-­‐sectarianism	   that	   recognized	   the	   exist-­‐ence	  of	  non-­‐Protestant	  Christian	  beliefs	  (not	  to	  mention	  non-­‐Christian	  religious	  be-­‐liefs)	  would	  require	  the	  elimination	  of	  Bible	  reading	  in	  the	  public	  schools,	  a	  policy	  that	   the	   City	   of	   Cincinnati	   enacted	   in	   1869	   partially	   in	   response	   to	   Catholic	   con-­‐cerns.76	  But	  the	  tack	  of	  eliminating	  Bible	  reading	  led	  to	  its	  own	  set	  of	  objections.	  The	  first	  was	  a	  pedagogical	   concern—it	  was	  argued	   that	  public	   school	   children	  would	  thereby	  be	  denied	   the	  benefit	   of	   the	   teaching	   of	  morals	   and	   values	   that	   the	  Bible	  purportedly	  provided.77	  The	  second	  had	  a	  constitutional	  echo—that	  eliminating	  Bi-­‐ble	   reading	  meant	   that	   schools	  were	   being	   improperly	   secularized	   and	   therefore	  hostile	  to	  religion.78	  The	   same	   debate	  was	   repeated	   during	   the	  mid-­‐twentieth	   century	  when	   the	  
                                                            	   72.	  	   “Protestantism	  was	  such	  a	  part	  of	  the	  national	  identity	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  that	  educa-­‐tors	  had	  difficulty	  distinguishing	  between	  it	  and	  republican	  values;	  they	  ‘assumed	  that	  Americanism	  and	  Protestantism	  were	  synonyms	  and	  that	  education	  and	  Protestantism	  were	  allies.’”	  GREEN,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	   19	   (quoting	   Timothy	   L.	   Smith,	  Protestant	   Schooling	   and	   American	   Nationality,	   1800-­‐1850,	   53	   J.	   AM.	  HIST.	  679,	  680	  (1967)).	  	   73.	  	   GREEN,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  21-­‐24.	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  at	  103-­‐04.	  	   75.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  34	  (noting	  criticism	  by	  Catholics	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  King	  James	  (Protestant)	  Bible	  and	  de-­‐sire	  for	  the	  Douay	  (Catholic)	  Bible	  to	  be	  available	  for	  Catholic	  students).	  	   76.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  93.	  	   77.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  93,	  98.	  	   78.	  	   See	   id.	   at	   99	   (describing	   opponents’	   declarations	   that	   atheists,	   infidels,	   and	   skeptics	   had	   allied	  themselves	   with	   the	   Catholics	   to	   “plunge	   [the	   nation]	   into	   the	   bottomless	   pit	   of	   Atheism.”,	   (quoting	  AMORY	  D.	  MAYO,	  RELIGION	  IN	  THE	  COMMON	  SCHOOLS:	  THREE	  LECTURES	  DELIVERED	  IN	  THE	  CITY	  OF	  CINCINNATI,	   IN	  OCTOBER,	  1869	  20-­‐28,	  35,	  36	  (1869)).	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constitutionality	  of	  Bible	  reading	  and	  prayer	  in	  the	  public	  schools	  was	  addressed	  by	  the	   Supreme	   Court.79	   Again	   the	   argument	   was	   advanced	   that	   Bible	   reading	   and	  school	   prayer	   (no	  matter	  how	  devoid	  of	   theological	   content)	  were	   inevitably	   sec-­‐tarian.	  Again	  the	  response	  was	  that	  their	  exclusion	  from	  the	  public	  schools	  consti-­‐tuted	  hostility	  towards	  religion.80	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  the	  argument	  has	  again	  resurfaced	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  words	  “under	  God”	  in	  the	  reci-­‐tation	  of	  the	  Pledge	  of	  Allegiance	  in	  the	  public	  schools.81	  Now,	  because	  the	  country	  has	  become	  even	  more	  religiously	  diverse,	  any	  public	  expression	  of	  religion	  could	  be	   seen	  as	   taking	  on	  some	  aspect	  of	   sectarian	  preference.	  Thus,	  while	   it	  might	  be	  true	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  relatively	  innocuous	  phrase	  “under	  God”	  in	  the	  Pledge	  can	  be	  defended	  as	  being	  little	  more	  than	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  general	  non-­‐sectarian	  belief	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  that	  is	  fully	  consistent	  with	  the	  beliefs	  of	  a	  vast	  majori-­‐ty	  of	  Americans,82	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  those	  words	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  explicitly	  and	  overtly	  sectarian	  to	  atheists	  or	  to	  those	  believers	  whose	  religious	  tenets	  do	  not	  in-­‐clude	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  Supreme	  Being.83	  The	  question,	  then	  as	  now,	  is	  when	  does	  the	   commitment	   to	   non-­‐sectarianism	   end	   and	   hostility	   to	   religion	   begin?	   The	   an-­‐swer,	   then	   as	   now,	   depends	   as	  much	   on	   the	   social	   and	   intellectual	   context	   of	   the	  times	  as	  it	  does	  upon	  abstract	  theories	  about	  the	  appropriate	  relationship	  between	  Church	  and	  State.	  
	  	  The	  Non-­‐Lesson	  of	  the	  Blaine	  Amendment	  and	  the	  Constitutionality	  of	  Aid	  to	  Private	  
Religious	  Schools	  	   A	   final	   lesson	  may	  be	   a	  non-­‐lesson.	  The	  Blaine	  Amendment,	   of	   course,	   did	  not	  pass.84	  Many	  have	  tried	  to	  make	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  this	  non-­‐event.	  Does	  this	  mean,	  as	  some	  have	  argued,85	  that	  the	  nation	  in	  1876	  believed	  that	  state	  funding	  of	  private	  religious	  school	  was	  not	  problematic?	  Or	  is	  Green	  correct	  in	  asserting	  that	  in	  1876	  “the	   no-­‐funding	   rule	  was	   the	   accepted	   legal	   doctrine	   in	   the	   states”86	   and	   that	   the	  passage	  of	  the	  Amendment	  would	  have	  merely	  “nationalized	  the	  legal	  status	  quo”?87	  My	   sense	   is	   that	   although	   Green	  may	   have	   the	   better	   historical	   case	   in	   this	  dispute,	  any	  attempt	  to	  draw	  definitive	  conclusions	  from	  the	  historical	  record	  sur-­‐rounding	  the	  Blaine	  Amendment	  would	  be	  unsuccessful.	  Green’s	  book	  is	  masterful	  in	  showing	  that	  there	  were	  a	  multitude	  of	  cross-­‐currents	  at	  work	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  regarding	  the	  appropriate	  relationship	  between	  Church	  and	  State.	  He	  does	  not	  show,	  nor	  could	  he,	  that	  there	  was	  anything	  close	  to	  universal	  consensus	  on	  any	  issue	   or	   that	   there	   was	   even	   consensus	   among	   those	   who	   shared	   the	   same	   end	  goals.	  Some	  were	  against	  aid	  to	  private	  religious	  schools	  because	  they	  opposed	  aid	  
                                                            	   79.	  	   Sch.	  Dist.	  of	  Abington	  Twp.	  v.	  Schempp,	  374	  U.S.	  203	  (1963).	  	   80.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  245-­‐46.	  	   81.	  	   See	  Elk	  Grove	  Unified	  Sch.	  Dist.	  v.	  Newdow,	  542	  U.S.	  1	  (2004).	  	   82.	  	   Id.	  at	  42-­‐44	  (describing	  the	  reference	  to	  God	  as	  “minimal”	  and	  “ceremonial”).	  	  	  	  	   83.	  	   Id.	  at	  8,	  42	  (referencing	  the	  perspectives	  of	  atheists	  and	  members	  of	  nontheistic	  religious	  groups).	  	   84.	  	   GREEN,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  222.	  	   85.	  	   Id.	  at	  228.	  	   86.	  	   Id.	  at	  227.	  	   87.	  	   Id.	  at	  230.	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to	   religion	   generally,	   some	   because	   they	   were	   concerned	   with	   underfunding	   the	  public	   schools	   through	   diverting	   resources	   to	   private	   actors,	   some	   because	   they	  wanted	   to	   establish	   the	   primacy	   of	   Protestantism,	   some	   because	   they	  were	   anti-­‐Catholic	  bigots,	   and	   some	  because	   they	  believed	   that	   funding	   religion	  violated	  es-­‐sential	   constitutional	   principles	   of	   Church-­‐State	   separation.	   Bringing	   only	   one	   of	  these	  rationales	  to	  the	  fore	  as	  the	  definitive	  rationale	  underlying	  nineteenth	  centu-­‐ry	  support	  for	  the	  no-­‐aid	  principle	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  unjustified.	  Nevertheless,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument,	  let	  us	  assume	  otherwise	  for	  a	  moment	  and	  accept	  the	  assertion	  that	  nineteenth	  century	  thought	  coalesced	  around	  the	  be-­‐lief	  that	  public	  aid	  to	  private	  religious	  school	  violated	  the	  Constitution.	  Should	  that	  guide	  our	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  understanding?	  In	  answering	  this	  question,	  consider	  what	  we	  have	  already	  learned	  about	  the	  changeable	  meaning	  of	  non-­‐sectarianism.	  As	  diversity	  of	  religion	  in	  America	  broad-­‐ened,	   the	  meaning	  of	   religious	  neutrality	  necessarily	   changed.88	  Accordingly,	  what	  was	  constitutionally	  unobjectionable	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  was	  seen	  as	  raising	  major	  concerns	  one	  half	  century	  later.	  Parallel	   changes	   in	   the	   way	   we	   view	   religion	   may	   similarly	   affect	   our	   ap-­‐proach	   to	   aid	   to	   private	   religious	   schools.	   In	   our	   era,	   it	   has	   become	   increasingly	  hard	  to	  distinguish	  between	  religion	  and	  non-­‐religion	  both	  in	  the	  manner	  individu-­‐als	  adhere	  to	  their	  belief	  structures	  and	  the	  services	  that	  religious	  and	  non-­‐religious	  institutions	  provide.	   In	   such	  circumstances,	  disallowing	   religious	  entities	   from	  re-­‐ceiving	  the	  same	  type	  of	  aid	  that	  parallel	  non-­‐religious	  institutions	  receive	  may	  take	  on	  aspects	  of	  hostility	   towards	  religion	   that	  did	  not	  exist	  when	   the	  nature	  of	   reli-­‐gion	  was	  far	  more	  distinct.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  any	  or	  all	  aid	  to	  private	  religious	  schools	  is	  or	  is	  not	  constitutionally	  permissible.89	  Rather,	  as	  with	  Bible	  reading,	  the	  lesson	  from	  history	  is	  that	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  aid	  to	  private	  religious	  school	  de-­‐pends	  as	  much	  on	  the	  context	  of	  the	  times	  as	  it	  does	  on	  abstract	  constitutional	  prin-­‐ciple.	   PART	  III:	  CONCLUSION	  Stephen	  Green’s	  book,	  The	  Bible,	  the	  School,	  and	  the	  Constitution	  offers	  a	  com-­‐pelling	   and	   colorful	   account	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   School	  Question,	   the	  debate	   over	   the	  issues	  of	  aid	  to	  private	  religious	  schools,	  and	  Bible	  reading	  in	  the	  public	  school	  that	  occupied	   nineteenth	   century	   American	   history.	   In	   so	   doing	   he	   effectively	   accom-­‐plishes	  his	  central	  purpose—refuting	  Justice	  Thomas’s	  assertion	  in	  Mitchell	  v.	  Helms	  that	   the	   principle	   that	   no	   state	   aid	   should	   be	   granted	   to	   private	   religious	   schools	  was	  based	  in	  anti-­‐Catholic	  animus.	  Along	   the	  way,	  Green’s	  exposition	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  history	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  broader	  lesson	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  and	  perhaps	  about	   constitutional	   interpretation	   more	   generally.	   In	   one	   way,	   Green’s	   history	  shows	  us	  that	  the	  more	  things	  change,	  the	  more	  they	  stay	  the	  same.90	  After	  all,	  dis-­‐
                                                            	   88.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  22	  (explaining	  how	  Protestant	  Bible	  readings	  were	  considered	  neutral	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  community).	  	   89.	  	   Nor	  does	  it	  shed	  any	  light	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  aid	  to	  religious	  schools	  is	  good	  public	  policy.	  	   90.	  	   “What	  has	  been	  will	  be	  again,	  what	  has	  been	  done	  will	  be	  done	  again;	  there	  is	  nothing	  new	  under	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putes	   over	   aid	   to	   private	   religious	   schools	   and	   the	   role	   of	   religion	   in	   the	   public	  schools	  are	  as	  divisive	  now	  as	  they	  were	  then.	  But	  Green’s	  history	  also	  shows	  that	  things	  do	  change.	  The	  term	  non-­‐sectarian	  meant	  something	  different	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  when	  the	  nation	  was	  predominately	  Protestant	  than	  it	  did	  after	  the	  country	  became	  more	  religiously	  diverse.	   The	   application	   of	   a	   constitutional	   rule	   reflecting	   a	   commitment	   to	   non-­‐sectarianism	  would	  therefore	  lead	  to	  a	  different	  result	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  cen-­‐tury	  than	  at	  its	  end.	  Corresponding	  changes	  in	  how	  we	  perceive	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  religion	  from	  non-­‐religion	  may	  similarly	  affect	  our	  understandings	  of	  the	  no-­‐aid	  rule.	  One	  of	  the	  many	  challenges	  of	  constitutional	  law	  is	  how	  to	  apply	  longstanding	  principles	  to	  changing	  contexts.	  Green’s	  account	  of	  the	  School	  Question	  provides	  a	  case	  history	  for	  this	  study.	  	  
                                                                                                                                                    the	  sun.”	  Ecclesiastes	  1:9.	  (NIV).	  	  
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/18
